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1. Introduction 
In the construction of a market-based development strategy, a key policy consideration is the selection 
of an appropriate exchange rate regime, which should be consistent with the attainment of 
macroeconomic stability. In particular, the policymaker’s preferences are external competitiveness and 
price stability. At the extremes, the choice lies between a fixed exchange rate regime, achieved 
through an anchor to a single currency or a basket of currencies, and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The choice of either of the two extremes or an intermediate arrangement reflects preferences with 
respect to macroeconomic objectives. In Botswana, the desire is to foster sustainable growth through 
diversification and export competitiveness. The currency, the pula, is pegged to a basket of currencies 
that reflects the country’s trading patterns and comprises the South African rand and the Special 
Drawing Right (SDR). The objective is to stabilise the trade-weighted real exchange rate. The 
performance of the pula exchange rate as well as, broadly, the monetary policy framework has largely 
reflected this objective. 
2.  Exchange rate regimes 
Exchange rates are typically categorised as floating or fixed. A fixed exchange rate is one in which the 
value of one currency vis-à-vis another currency is held constant by government intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. The general case in favour of a fixed exchange rate is that it can serve as a 
nominal anchor against inflation if the exchange rate is fixed against the currency of a country with 
relatively low inflation. Pegged exchange rates also benefit from a discipline effect since there are 
generally political costs associated with abandoning the peg, as there may be a need to adjust other 
policies. In addition, there is a confidence effect whereby the connection of the exchange rate with a 
stable foreign currency engenders a willingness to hold the domestic currency or assets denominated 
in the domestic currency. Fixed exchange rates in developing countries have also been justified in 
instances where the financial sector is not well developed and because of the large role of the public 
sector as a supplier of foreign exchange. Although keeping the exchange rate fixed may help stabilise 
the price level, it is not viable in the presence of a large current account deficit and a foreign exchange 
or external borrowing constraint.  
A floating exchange rate is one in which the value of the currency in terms of another is determined by 
demand and supply in the foreign exchange market. A floating exchange rate does not, however, 
imply that the authorities are unconcerned about the level of the exchange rate. Rather, the authorities 
employ domestic policy instruments - especially interest rates - to realise their objective with respect to 
the exchange rate. This is particularly important given the fact that although, in a floating exchange 
rate regime, a nominal depreciation may improve the trade balance and the balance of payments, it 
might lead to inflation, thus eroding competitiveness. Therefore, there should be other instruments 
available to stabilise inflation. 
In practice, there is a range of intermediate exchange rate regimes. Intermediate exchange rate 
arrangements provide scope for short-term flexibility within exchange rate margins and medium-term 
parity adjustments. The variability of any exchange rate regime is determined by the structural 
characteristics of an economy and the environment within which policy is operated. For example, the 
choice of a basket as opposed to a peg to a single currency, apart from being necessitated by trading 
patterns, is also intended to dampen the impact of external sources of exchange rate instability arising 
from large fluctuations among the real exchange rates of industrial countries. Alternatively, the 
crawling or adjustable peg is an attempt to avoid domestic sources of instability, in particular to 
alleviate periodic overvaluations and exchange rate crises associated with a fixed peg where there is 
high inflation. A crawling peg can be subject to discretionary change with a future path announced or  
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not announced. It can also be subject to a non-discretionary feedback rule that may or may not be 
made public.  
Alternatively, the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime may be derived from belonging to a 
monetary union; effectively surrendering the power to alter the exchange rate through a common 
currency. This arrangement establishes the credibility of an anti-inflationary policy while there are 
institutional features that make it costly to alter the exchange rate. There are, however, costs 
associated with forgoing the use of the exchange rate as a policy instrument, particularly in the 
presence of large external shocks.  
3.  Botswana’s exchange rate regime and policy objective 
Whether fixed, floating or an intermediate arrangement, the objective of any regime is the realisation of 
a stable exchange rate. As indicated above, exchange rate policy is usually driven by two distinct, and 
sometimes competing, objectives: external competitiveness and maintenance of price stability. The 
first objective is aimed at improving the balance of payments while the second objective is pursued 
insofar as low inflation is desirable from the point of view of macroeconomic stability, and to the extent 
that it also contributes to efficiency in resource allocation.  
In Botswana, the exchange rate policy reflects the emphasis given to the strategy of economic 
diversification, the need to promote the competitive position of Botswana’s non-traditional exports and 
import substitution activities. In the endeavour to reach these goals, most of the nation’s exchange 
rate history has seen the government, through the Bank of Botswana, pursue a policy best described 
as that of exchange rate protection.
1 This policy has sought to counteract a potential squeeze
2 on the 
tradable sector by facilitating a shift out of the non-tradable goods sector and into the tradable goods 
sector; hence boosting the prospects for employment, output and profits of the latter.  
In an attempt to mitigate the susceptibility to volatility of an independent float and the straitjacket of a 
fixed exchange rate, Botswana, like several other developing countries, has chosen an intermediate 
exchange rate regime, which enables it to benefit from the positive aspects of the two extreme 
exchange rate mechanisms. Significantly, in a situation where there is a large inflow of diamond 
revenues, a free float might lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate to levels that would make 
non-diamond production unprofitable (the so-called “Dutch disease”), which would be inconsistent with 
the country’s development and diversification objectives.  
Botswana has since the introduction of the pula
3 in 1976 adopted a fixed but adjustable peg system. 
Initially, the pula was pegged to the US dollar and, prior to 1980, the peg was revalued on one 
occasion for anti-inflationary reasons. The single currency peg coincided with a period in which the 
South African rand was also pegged to the US dollar. Specifically, the exchange rate at which the pula 
was pegged to the US dollar was equivalent to that of the rand against the dollar. This implied equality 
between the pula and the rand. This effect expired when the rand was taken off the US dollar peg and 
allowed to float. To subdue the effects of exchange rate volatility between the pula and the rand, the 
pula basket was introduced in 1980. From 1980 to 1991, the exchange rate of the pula was subject to 
both discrete changes to the composition of the basket as well as devaluation and revaluation 
(Table 1). However, since the last publicly announced devaluation in 1991, the management of the 
exchange rate has involved technical adjustments of the basket composition aimed at maintaining real 
exchange rate stability. 
                                                       
1   Exchange rate protection occurs when a country protects its traded goods sector (export and import-competing activities) 
relative to the non-traded goods sector by depreciating the exchange rate or preventing an exchange rate appreciation. 
2   A tradable squeeze refers to the negative impact of a strong domestic currency on domestic export activities. Typically, this 
effect arises when a boom in a country’s mineral (or more generally natural resource) sector produces a decline in other 
export industries. The mechanisms that produce this result are normally a combination of a nominal appreciation of the 
domestic currency and continuous increases in nominal wages. 
3    From independence in 1966 up to 1976, Botswana retained its membership of the Rand Monetary Area, a regional 
monetary union controlled by South Africa and including Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, which are still members. See the 
paper in this volume by van Zyl for further information.  
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Table 1 
Chronology of exchange rate events from 1996 
Date Action  Comments 
1966-76  Participation in rand monetary union.  No independent exchange rate or monetary policy. 
August 1976  Introduction of the pula, pegged at 
USD 1.15. 
Rand pegged to US dollar at same rate ensuring 
parity between pula and rand. 
April 1977  5% pula revaluation.  Anti-inflation measure. 
January 1979  Rand taken off US dollar peg and 
floated. 
Rand appreciates against US dollar as gold price 
rises. 
June 1980  Pula taken off US dollar peg. 
Introduction of pula basket comprising 
SDR and rand. 
To reduce volatility of rand/pula exchange rate. 
November 1980  5% pula revaluation.  Anti-inflation measure as imported inflation rises 
following pula depreciation against rand. 
May 1982  10% pula devaluation.  Part of stabilisation measures in response to 
1981-82 balance of payments crisis. 
February 1984  Foreign debt standstill for 
South Africa and run on the rand. 
Rapid depreciation of the pula against the dollar 
as rand continues to depreciate. 
July 1984  5% pula devaluation.  Competitiveness measure following rand collapse 
and rapid pula appreciation against the rand. 
August 1984  Rand weight in pula basket adjusted.  To reduce drift of pula from rand. 
January 1985  15% pula devaluation.  Additional competitiveness measure in response 
to rapid pula appreciation against rand. 
January 1986  New pula basket introduced.  Due to rapid rand appreciation. 
June 1989  5% pula revaluation.  Anti-inflation measure. 
August 1990  5% pula devaluation.  Competitiveness measure. 
August 1991  5% pula devaluation.  Competitiveness measure. 
June 1994 to 
date 
Technical adjustments.  Changes to the basket to reflect trade patterns 
and reversal of weight drift aimed at maintaining 
competitiveness and real exchange rate stability. 
Source: Bank of Botswana. 
 
The choice of to which currencies to peg the pula was guided by trade patterns and the vehicle 
currencies used in international trade and payments. Botswana has an undiversified trade pattern, 
whereby the bulk of the traditional exports (diamonds, copper and nickel, soda ash and beef) are 
denominated in US dollars and sterling while non-traditional exports and most imports are 
denominated or invoiced in South African rand. The pula is, therefore, pegged to a trade-weighted 
basket of currencies - comprising the rand and SDR - so as to smooth exchange rate fluctuations 
among the trading partners.
4 The rand has a greater share in the basket reflecting the need to protect 
the interests of the majority of Botswana’s domestic firms, whose consumption, expenditure and 
revenue decisions have a significant rand-denominated component. 
In addition, for a long time the adjustable peg adopted by Botswana was such that the rand/pula 
exchange rate was monitored closely in order to maintain stability. Adjustments were, therefore, 
                                                       
4    The appropriate weights (which are not publicly disclosed) of the respective currencies used in the pula basket are 
determined in part by the bilateral share of trade of the respective country. In Botswana’s case, the trade weighting 
abstracts from diamond sales, since those exports are basically insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations.  
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occasionally made to the peg if it was considered that the rand/pula exchange rate had fluctuated too 
much. In effect, this implied that the country maintained a managed exchange rate vis-à-vis the South 
African rand. Thus, for most of the time the exchange rate moved in line with the South African rand 
although the magnitudes were moderated by the presence of the SDR component. 
An important goal of exchange rate policy is stabilisation of the real exchange rate in relation to 
Botswana’s main trading partners. In line with this objective, it follows that the authorities closely 
monitor relative inflation performance between Botswana, South Africa and SDR countries. More 
generally, if the price level in Botswana is rising relative to that of trading partner countries, the 
equilibrium value of the pula will be falling in relation to the basket, and vice versa. If the inflation 
differential is considered inimical to the attainment of real exchange rate stability, then corrective 
interventions are effected by the authorities, in order to restore the given exchange rate objective. 
Corrective measures are, however, not limited to the exchange rate mechanism but include monetary 
policy action to achieve an inflation objective that given the inflation in trading partner countries is 
consistent with maintaining real pula exchange rate stability. In general, monetary policy action is 
preferred while discretionary devaluation or revaluation has not been used for some time now. As 
evident from Graph 1, although Botswana’s inflation has tended to be higher than that of its trading 
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4.  Recent developments in the exchange rate 
The adjustable peg regime presently in use in Botswana provides the authorities with a certain degree 
of flexibility to manipulate the exchange rate in a manner complementary to the exchange rate policy 
objective. To date, Botswana’s authorities have by and large avoided overvaluation of the pula, by not 
keeping the exchange rate too rigid in the face of differential inflation or allowing the currency to move 
upwards too much so as to threaten export competitiveness. 
Up to the middle of 2000, the movements of the pula reflected the relatively high weight of the rand in 
the basket as well as the fact that its fluctuation vis-à-vis the rand was closely managed. Thus, the 
pula tended to depreciate and was unstable against the major international currencies as the rand 
weakened but was relatively stable in nominal terms against the rand (see Graph 2).   
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Graph 2 
Nominal exchange rate indices 
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Source: Bank of Botswana. 
From the middle of 2000, a greater focus on real exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the basket and 
removal of the band surrounding the rand meant that the nominal exchange rate of the pula against 
the rand appreciated beyond what had hitherto been experienced. In particular, the pula has gradually 
appreciated against the rand, while that currency has fallen in international foreign exchange markets. 
Targeting the stability of the pula vis-à-vis a trade-weighted index implies that the emphasis is on 
maintaining nominal effective exchange rate stability (as opposed to focusing on bilateral exchange 
rates), in an attempt to diversify the nation’s export base (in terms of both products and markets). The 
policy of keeping the nominal effective exchange rate stable also implies that competitiveness is most 
appropriately measured by the real effective exchange rate (Graph 3). Hence, exchange rate policy, in 
tandem with monetary policy, is designed to keep Botswana’s inflation rate no higher than the 
weighted average of the inflation rates of major trading partners. 
 
Graph 3 
Real exchange rate indices 
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5. Conclusion 
The exchange rate regime in Botswana can be characterised as an adjustable peg, which over time 
has had elements of both unannounced discretionary change as well as a non-discretionary feedback 
rule. The policy, consistent with other government policies, supports the development objectives of 
export competitiveness, diversification and growth within a stable macroeconomic environment. In 
particular, the discretionary approach to the exchange rate and the monetary policy framework aim to 
achieve real effective exchange rate stability. Botswana’s inflation has not been substantially higher 
than that of its trading partners, contributing to real exchange rate stability. Over time, the performance 
of the trade-weighted real exchange rate has largely reflected the stability objective, albeit 
appreciating somewhat. The trade balance and overall balance of payments have been positive while 
there has been growth and diversification of non-traditional exports and broadly satisfactory non-
mining output expansion. 